We propose a theory of asset prices that emphasizes heterogeneous information as the main element determining prices of different securities. Our main analytical innovation is in formulating a model of noisy information aggregation through asset prices, which is parsimonious and tractable, yet flexible in the specification of cash flow risks. We show that the noisy aggregation of heterogeneous investor beliefs drives a systematic wedge between the impact of fundamentals on an asset price, and the corresponding impact on cash flow expectations. The key intuition behind the wedge is that the identity of the marginal trader has to shift for different realization of the underlying shocks to satisfy the market-clearing condition. This identity shift amplifies the impact of price on the marginal trader's expectations. We derive tight characterization for both the conditional and the unconditional expected wedges. Our first main theorem shows how the sign of the expected wedge (that is, the difference between the expected price and the dividends) depends on the shape of the dividend payoff function and on the degree of informational frictions. Our second main theorem provides conditions under which the variability of prices exceeds the variability for realized dividends. We conclude with two applications of our theory.
Introduction
Dispersed investor information, and disagreement among investors about the expected cash-flows of different securities is a common feature of many, if not most financial markets. In this paper, we develop a parsimonious, flexible model of asset pricing in which heterogeneity of information and its aggregation in the market emerges as the core force determining asset prices and expected returns.
Our model is tractable for a rather general specification of the asset's underlying cash-flows, and it delivers novel insights and sharp predictions that link the asset's predicted prices and returns to features of the market environment and the distribution of the underlying cash-flow risk. We further show that heterogeneous information provides a natural source of excess price volatility. Finally, our model can easily be adapted to address a variety of questions. Using our model, we reconsider two classical results in a heterogeneous information setting: the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, and the sustainability of bubbles in a dynamic environment.
Specifically, we consider an asset market along the lines of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) . 1 An investor pool is divided into informed traders who have observed a noisy signal about the value of an underlying cash flow, and uninformed noise traders. The traders all submit orders to buy shares in the cash flow at the going price.
The price serves as a noisy signal of the state, which traders use along with their private signals to form an update about the cash flows. Using the market structure first introduced in Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006), we assume that traders are risk neutral but face limits on their asset positions. This enables us to derive a closed-form characterization for prices and expected dividends conditional on the price, with no restriction on cash flows other than monotonicity in the underlying fundamental shocks.
In our model, the asset price is equal to the expectation of cash flows for a "marginal investor" who is just indifferent between investing and not investing in the asset. We compare the marginal investor's posterior belief to the belief of an objective outsider, who uses the observation of the price to update beliefs about dividends, or equivalently an "econometrician" who uses a sample of price-dividend observations to estimate this relationship. Compared to the outsider, the marginal trader treats the information contained in the price as if he over-estimated its information content.
His posterior expectations thus attach a higher weight to the market signal and a lower residual uncertainty to the fundamental than would be justified by its true information content. We label this discrepancy the "information aggregation wedge".
1 See Brunnermeier (2001), Vives (2008) , and Veldkamp (2011) for textbook discussions.
Despite its appearance, the information aggregation wedge is not the result of non-Bayesian updating or irrational trading decisions. Instead, it results from compositional shifts under investor heterogeneity: to maintain market-clearing, the identity of the marginal trader has to change with the observed price in a way that amplifies the impact of the price on the marginal trader's expectations. For example, consider either an increase in the informed traders' demand coming from a more favorable realization of the fundamentals (and hence their aggregate signal distribution), or an increase in the noise traders' demand. These shifts both result in a higher price and a higher expectation of future dividends, because of the information conveyed through the price.
In addition, since the demand by informed traders has become larger (or the pool of available securities smaller), the marginal investor's private signal has to become more optimistic just to maintain market-clearing. This further increases the price, but not expected dividends, over and above the direct signal effect. The asset price thus appears to respond more to the market signal than would be justified on the basis of its true information content.
From an ex ante perspective, we characterize the average price and dividends in closed form as a function of the cash flow distribution and a parameter that summarizes the severity of the informational friction. This information friction parameter depends on the accuracy of informed traders' private signals, and the variance of noise trading shocks. Intuitively, the unconditional wedge is the expected value of a mean-preserving spread of the underlying distribution of the payoffs, i.e. from an ex ante perspective the market puts a higher weight on the tails than the objective distribution. Moreover, the unconditional wedge has increasing differences between the informational noise parameter, and the asymmetry between upside and downside risks, where the latter is defined as a partial order on payoff risks that compares the marginal gains and losses at fixed distances from the prior mean of the fundamental.
From this characterization, Theorem 1 then provides several general implications for expected returns. Regardless of the informational parameters, the unconditional wedge is zero when payoff risk is symmetric. The wedge is positive (meaning that the expected price exceeds expected dividends) for risks that are dominated by the upside, and negative for risks that are dominated by the downside. Moreover, in absolute value this wedge becomes more pronounced for more asymmetric payoff risks, or for a higher degree of information aggregation frictions. Our model thus offers sharp, novel predictions that link the occurrence, size and direction of price premia and discounts, both unconditionally and conditionally on the realization of shocks, to specific characteristic of the market and the underlying cash-flow risk.
Theorem 2 characterizes the variability of prices relative to expected and realized dividends. We show that prices are always more variable than expected dividends. If the information aggregation wedge is sufficiently important, prices may even be more variable than realized dividends. In the limiting cases, the variability of prices exceeds that of realized dividend by any arbitrarily large factor. Moreover, the correlation between price and realized dividends may be arbitrarily close to zero. This stands in sharp contrast with the standard result in the asset pricing literature that price volatility coming from dividend expectations is bounded above by the volatility of realized dividends (as in West, 1988) . Since dividend volatility in the data falls short in explaining variability of prices (LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Shiller, 1981) , the consensus explanation stresses variation in stochastic discount rates (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Cochrane, 1992) . Our theory instead suggests that high price volatility could result from volatile market expectations about dividends in a fully rational environment despite low variability in observed dividends, as long as the informational frictions are strong enough.
We consider two applications of our theory. The first revisits the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, which establishes that under conditions of no arbitrage the total market value of any given cash flow is not influenced by how it is divided into separate securities. Absent distortions inside the firm, the optimal capital structure is indeterminate and disconnected from the firm's market valuation (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) . Capital structure theories then focus mostly on trade-offs that affect the generation of cash flows inside the firm, such as agency costs, information frictions or tax distortions, assuming that the market value of the resulting cash flow is not affected by its split into different securities. Here instead we take the view that capital structure and firm value may also be influenced by heterogeneous information and financial market frictions.
We consider a seller who is splitting a given cash flow into two pieces which are sold to separate investor pools in two different markets, and suppose that at least one of the pieces is dominated either by upside or by downside risk. We show that the expected revenue of the seller is not affected by the split, if and only if the two markets are characterized by identical informational characteristics. However, when the investor pools differ, the seller can manipulate her expected revenue by selling downside risks in the market with smaller information aggregation frictions, and upside risks in the market with larger information aggregation frictions. The seller maximizes expected revenue by completely separating upside and downside risks, splitting the cash flow into a debt claim for the downside, and an equity claim for the upside, with a default point for debt at the prior median.
Second, we consider the sustainability of rational bubbles. A well-known result shows that the absence of arbitrage eliminates the possibility of persistent over-pricing of securities (Tirole, 1982;  induce agents to increase the price bid in the current period, the combination of no arbitrage with transversality conditions (or backwards induction, in case of assets with finite horizons) rules out the possibility of any security trading at a price that exceeds the net present value of expected future cash flows.
We consider a simple, infinitely repeated version of our trading model with constant discounting, and give conditions under which a security may be permanently over-or under-priced, regardless of current market conditions. As usual, we can break down the current price, expected dividends and wedge into a component resulting from expectations about current cash-flows, and a component resulting from expected discounted future cash-flows and prices. The former inherits the same properties as the static conditional information aggregation wedge, while the latter inherits the properties of the unconditional wedge. If the cash-flow has a bounded downside risk and is dominated by the upside, and traders are sufficiently patient, then the positive expected future wedge more than offsets any negative current wedge. The asset then trades at a premium over its expected dividend value regardless of the current state realization. The flipside of these conditions shows that securities that have bounded upside and are dominated by the downside risk may be permanently underpriced.
Finally, we discuss the theoretical robustness of the information aggregation wedge. First, we generalize distributional assumptions for fundamentals and signals, and by considering arbitrary bounds on the portfolio holdings. Second, we also extend the financial market model to include uninformed traders which partially arbitrage the wedge.
Our paper contributes to a large literature on noisy information aggregation in asset markets, including the papers cited above. Much of this literature works within a canonical preference structure of CARA utility and normally distributed signals and dividends. Remarkably, the information aggregation wedge appears to have received little attention in this literature, even though it is present in these canonical models, and, as we show, is the source of rich implications for prices, trading activities, and market volatility. 2 By avoiding the restrictive functional form assumptions on cash-flow distributions, we are able to provide a characterization of this wedge for a general class of securities and draw implications that link average returns and return volatility to features of the cash-flow distribution and the importance of information frictions.
Another influential literature emphasizes heterogeneous beliefs and short sales constraints as 2 The only written statement of this observation that we have found appears in Vives (2008) , where it is only mentioned in passing.
potential sources of bubbles, mis-pricing, and market anomalies (Harrison and Kreps, 1978 Hong and Sraer, 2011) . Mispricing is sustained by the option to resell an overvalued security to an even more optimistic buyer in the future. This option becomes valuable in the presence of (one-sided) short-sales constraints, and implies a channel for over-valuation.
Heterogeneity in prior beliefs is taken as exogenous, and with the exception of Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), traders do not update from the observation of prices. We touch on similar themes, but stay within the REE tradition in which traders' beliefs result from exogenous signals, and information aggregation through prices imposes tight restrictions on the heterogeneity in beliefs.
Furthermore, our limits to arbitrage are not explicitly asymmetric, give rise to over-as well as under-valuation results, and our market environment is static, so the resale option doesn't play an important role (except in the dynamic application to bubbles). The mechanism that gives rise to mis-pricing and bubbles is therefore quite different. 3 The literature on "over-confidence" explores how asset prices and financial markets are influenced by the degree to which investors over-estimate the accuracy of their own information (e.g. Odean, 1998, and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998) . When viewed from the perspective of a representative investor, the market price that emerges in our model is perfectly consistent with these same over-confidence biases, yet all investors are fully rational and not mistaken about the quality of their signals. What may look like an over-confidence bias in the aggregate can thus be accounted for by heterogeneity and aggregation from the micro level.
More generally, any theory of mispricing must rely on some source of noise affecting the market, coupled with some limits to the traders' ability to exploit the resulting arbitrage opportunity (see Gromb and Vayanos, 2010 , for an overview and numerous references). In our model, the combination of noise trading and limits to arbitrage with heterogeneous information leads not just to random errors in the price, but to systematic, predictable departures of the price from the asset's fundamental value. The exact nature of our limits to arbitrage assumptions (embedded in the position limits and the noise trading formulation) is not central for our results, but guarantees the tractability of the updating, with virtually no assumptions imposed on cash-flows.
In section 2, we describe our model and provide the equilibrium characterization of asset prices. 3 For example, the difference between our work and theories of bubbles based on short-sales constraints becomes clear if one considers the case of debt instruments, as in Hong and Sraer (2011) . Whereas in their model, short-sales constraints lead to over-valuation of debt, but with less volatility and trading volume than equity bubbles, our model predicts that debt may naturally be under-priced.
In section 3, we define the information aggregation wedge and discuss at length the resulting prediction for conditional and unconditional asset returns. Section 4 uses the insight offered by these two results to revisit the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and the existence of bubbles in the dynamic version of the model. Section 5 concludes the analysis with the robustness discussion.
Model
2.1 Agents, assets, information structure and financial market
The market is set as a Bayesian trading game with a unit measure of risk-neutral, informed traders, a stochastic measure of uninformed "noise traders", and a 'Walrasian auctioneer'. There is a risky asset whose supply is normalized to a unit measure, and whose dividend is a strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable function π(·) of a stochastic "fundamental" θ.
At the start, nature draws θ according to a normal distribution with mean 0, and unconditional
Each informed trader i then receives a noisy private signal x i which is normally distributed with a mean θ and a variance β −1 , and is i.i. 
where Φ(·) denotes a cumulative standard normal distribution, and Φ( √ β(x − θ)) represents the cross-sectional distribution of private signals x i conditional on the realization of θ. 4 In addition, there is stochastic demand for the asset from noise traders, which takes the form Φ (u), where u is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 u , u ∼ N (0, σ 2 u ), independently of θ. This specification is adapted from Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006), and allows us to preserve the tractability of Bayesian updating with normal posterior beliefs. 5 Once all traders have submitted their orders, the auctioneer selects a price P to clear the market. Formally, the market-clearing price function P : R 2 → R selects P from the correspondence 4 We assume that the Law of Large Numbers applies to the continuum of traders, so that conditional on θ the cross-sectional distribution of signal realizations ex post is the same as the ex ante distribution of traders' signals. 5 We generalize this demand specification in Section 4.2 allowing for price-elastic demands by noise traders.
After all trades are completed, the dividends π(θ) are realized and disbursed to the owners of the asset.
Let H(·|x, P ) : R → [0, 1] denote the traders' posterior cdf of θ, conditional on observing a private signal x, and conditional on the market price P . A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of demand functions d(x, P ) for informed traders, a price function P (θ, u), and posterior beliefs H(·|x, P ) such that (i) d(x, P ) is optimal given H(·|x, P ); (ii) the asset market clears for all (θ, u); and (iii) H(·|x, P ) satisfies Bayes' rule whenever applicable, i.e., for all p such that {(θ, u) : P (θ, u) = p} is non-empty.
Equilibrium Characterization
We begin by characterizing informed traders' demand. With risk-neutrality, the trader's expected value of holding the asset is π(θ)dH (θ|x, P ). Since private signals are log-concave and π(·)
is increasing in θ, posterior beliefs H(·|x, P ) are first-order stochastically increasing in x, and π(θ)dH (θ|x, P ) is strictly increasing in x, for any P that is observed in equilibrium (Milgrom, 1981) . The traders' decisions are therefore characterized by a signal threshold functionx :
, that is, the trader places an order to buy a share at price P , if and only if x i ≥x(P ). We call the trader who observes the signal equal to the threshold,
x =x (P ), and who is therefore indifferent, the marginal trader. The signal threshold is uniquely defined byx
Expression (2) illustrates three cases: (i) if the most optimistic trader's expected dividend is lower than the price, no trader buys, so the signal threshold becomes +∞; (ii) if the most pessimistic trader's expected dividend exceeds the price, all traders buy, and the threshold for buying is −∞; (iii) only some traders buy, and the thresholdx(P ) takes an interior value at which the marginal trader's posterior expectation of the dividend must equal the price. Aggregating the individual trading decisions, the informed demand is D(θ, P ) =
, which equals 0 ifx(P ) = +∞, and 1 ifx(P ) = −∞.
Next, we analyze the market-clearing condition. Since Φ(u) ∈ (0, 1), in equilibrium,x(·) must be finite for all P on the equilibrium path, and satisfy the third condition in (2) . From the marketclearing condition, we then have Φ( √ β (x(P ) − θ)) = Φ (u), which allows us to characterize the correspondence of market-clearing prices:
From now on, we focus on equilibria in which the price is conditioned on (θ, u) through the observable state variable z ≡ θ + 1/ √ β · u. The next lemma characterizes the resulting equilibrium beliefs. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Information Aggregation) (i) In any equilibrium with conditioning on z, the equilibrium price function P (z) is invertible.
(ii) Equilibrium beliefs for price realizations observed along the equilibrium path are given by
Part (ii) of the Lemma exploits the invertibility to arrive at a complete characterization of posterior beliefs H(·|x, P ). With invertibility, we can summarize information conveyed by the price through z. Conditional on θ, z is normally distributed with mean θ and variance σ 2 u /β. Thus, the price is isomorphic to a normally distributed signal of θ, with a precision that is increasing in the precision of private signals, and decreasing in the variance of demand shocks.
Using Lemma 1 we rewrite (2), the indifference condition that defines the signal thresholdx(P ):
This condition equates P to the marginal trader's expectation of dividends. The latter also depends on P through its effect on posterior beliefs. Using the market-clearing conditionx(P ) = z, Proposition 1 uniquely characterizes the market equilibrium. 7
Proposition 1 (Asset market equilibrium) For any increasing dividend function π(·), an asset market equilibrium exists, is unique, and is characterized by the price function P π (z) and the traders' threshold functionx(p) = z = P −1 π (p), where
7 Notice that this only implies the uniqueness of the equilibrium that conditions on the summary statistic z, not overall uniqueness of the equilibrium characterized in proposition 1.
The price function P π (z) is uniquely defined and strictly monotone, and therefore defines the unique market equilibrium. 8 3 The Information Aggregation Wedge
Conditional Information aggregation wedge
We now discuss how noisy information affects equilibrium prices and expected dividend values.
To be precise, we form expectations of dividends from the perspective of an outside observer (or "econometrician") who does not have access to any private signal about θ, but knows the parameters of the game and observes the realization of the price P , or equivalently the state z. This outsider
, and therefore has an expectation of dividends conditional on public information z, denoted V π (z):
The main observation from comparing Proposition 1 with equation (7) is that at the interim stage -when the share price is observed but before dividends are realized-the equilibrium price differs from the expected dividend, conditional on the public information. This difference is due to the impact of private information on equilibrium prices. We label this difference the information aggregation wedge,
The choice of V π (·) as a natural benchmark of comparison for P π (·) follows from the fact that V π (·) also corresponds to the expected dividend (or in a sufficiently large data set, to the average dividend), conditional on the observation of P (recall that P π (·) is invertible). This benchmark differs from the one chosen e.g. by Harrison and Kreps (1978) , who compare an asset's value to the dividend expectation of any trader in their market, or to an average of those expectations, as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) . Our formulation has the advantage that V π (·) and P π (·) both have direct empirical counterparts in any set of price-return data, and this formulation therefore allows us to directly focus on the empirical, testable implications of our model.
The price P π (z), and the expected dividend conditional on public information, V π (z), differ in how expectations of θ are formed. The price equals the dividend expectation of the marginal trader who is indifferent between keeping or selling her share. This trader conditions on the market signal z, as well as a private signal whose realization must equal the thresholdx(P ) in order to be consistent with the trader's indifference condition. The trader treats these two sources of information as mutually independent signals of θ. At the same time, the market-clearing condition implies thatx(P ) must equal z in order to equate demand and supply of shares. The marginal trader's expectation E (π(θ)|x = z, z) thus behaves as if she received one signal z of precision β + βσ −2 u instead of βσ −2 u . In contrast, the expected dividends E (π(θ)|z) conditional on P (or equivalently z) weighs z according to its true precision βσ −2 u .
Figure 1: Marginal Trader Identity Shift
The difference in the responsiveness of the price relative to the expected dividend conditional in the price results from the compositional shift in the identity of the traders holding the shares. This is depicted in figure 1 . Any increase in z shifts the identity of the marginal trader's private signal one-for-one. If θ increases, the distribution of private signals shifts up, so for a given signal threshold, demand for the asset by informed traders increases, but demand from uninformed traders is unchanged. If instead s increases, uninformed demand increases, but informed demand remains the same. In both cases, the asset is relatively scarcer for informed traders, so the threshold for the informed trader's private signal has to increase in order to clear the market. In addition to this compositional shift (which only appears in the expectation of the marginal trader, e.g. the price), all traders, as well as the uninformed outsider, recognize that an increase in z, as revealed through P shifts up their expectation of the state θ. This is reflected in the weight βσ −2 u attributed to z in both P π (z) and V π (z).
Belief heterogeneity and limits to arbitrage are both necessary ingredients to obtain the wedge.
If instead all informed traders have access to a common signal z of fundamentals, they all hold identical expectations and must be indifferent between buying and not buying to clear the market.
But this requires that the price equals the common expectation of the dividend, i.e. P π (z) = V π (z).
The same result applies with free entry of uninformed arbitrageurs (Kyle, 1985) .
The remainder of this subsection describes properties of the wedge, conditional on z, which will form the basis for our main results on expected returns and price volatility. To this end, we define
, and
as the response coefficients of the expectations of θ entering P π (·) and V π (·) to innovations in z.
The equilibrium price and expected dividends are then rewritten as:
This formulation summarizes the difference between the price and the expected dividend by the response parameters γ P and γ V , which measure the marginal trader's and outsider's update of θ to z. These parameter enter P π (·) and V π (·) in two ways: the marginal trader's expectation responds more strongly to z, and his residual uncertainty about θ (after observing z) is lower:
Using a third-order Taylor expansion, we approximate the wedge by
The term π (γ P z) − π (γ V z) captures the shift in expectations, while the second term in squared brackets captures the role of residual uncertainty. The latter plays a role only if π (·) is non-linear, and in that case matters through second-and higher derivatives. The shift in expectations from γ V z to γ P z amounts to a mean-preserving spread from an ex ante perspective, and is therefore a source of increased variability in the price, relative to expected fundamentals:
crosses 0 at a single point where z = 0, is negative when z < 0, and positive when z > 0.
When π (·) is linear, the higher sensitivity of expectations to z is the only effect determining the wedge, while the residual uncertainty plays no role. Panel a) of figure 2 plots the price (solid line), the expected dividend (dashed line) and conditional wedge (dashed-dotted line) as a function of the state variable z, for π(θ) = θ. The price is more sensitive to innovations in z than the expected dividend, resulting in a wedge W π (z) = (γ P − γ V )z that is negative for z < 0, zero for z = 0, and positive for z > 0.
For non-linear dividends, residual uncertainty shifts the level of the wedge up or down, depending on a comparison between the residual uncertainty levels 1 − γ P relative to 1 − γ V , and the second derivatives π (γ P z) and π (γ V z). At the prior mean z = 0, the second derivatives are comparable, so the reduction of uncertainty implies a negative wedge if π (0) > 0, and a positive wedge, if π (0) < 0. Away from z = 0, the third-and higher derivatives may reduce or even overturn this effect, and therefore make it impossible to offer precise results on the shape of W π (·) without additional restrictions. We illustrate these possibilities with two parametric examples that follow. 
In this case, the price and expected dividend are both exponential functions in z, with a stronger reaction of prices to z. The residual uncertainty affects both V π (z) and P π (z) multiplicatively, but the factor is larger for V π (z), reflecting the fact that residual uncertainty is greater for the outsider.
If k > 0, we then have a dividend function that is increasing, convex, and bounded below by zero ( figure 2, panel c) . The wedge is negative at z = 0 and non-monotone. It decreases at first, reaches its lowest value at some intermediate point, and is increasing and convex from there on,
The reverse image obtains when k < 0, in which case π is increasing, concave, and bounded above by zero (figure 2, panel d). For negative z, the wedge is negative at first and increasing in z, crossing 0 at z = k 2 σ −2 θ < 0. It reaches its maximum value at a negative z and then monotonically converges towards 0. This example thus confirms the intuitions from the shift in means which makes P π (z) more responsive to a shift in z, and the shift in residual uncertainty that is captured by the multiplicative factors. The curvature parameter k governs the shape of the wedge function, and whether the residual uncertainty increases or decreases the wedge.
We use this example to illustrate our two main results. First, we show that the expected wedge is positive if and only if k > 0, and negative if k < 0. That is, the security trades at a premium in the case with convex dividends and upside risks, and at a discount in the case with concave dividends and downside risks. Taking expectations, we have
which is positive whenever k > 0, and negative for k < 0 (and can be checked to approach 0 continuously as k → 0).
Second, we show that the model exhibits excess price volatility. Focusing on log variances for analytical convenience, we have:
Therefore, we observe that V ar (log P π (z)) > V ar (log V π (z)), for any parameter set. Moreover, if the information aggregation wedge becomes sufficiently important, then we may have γ 2 P /γ V > 1, and therefore V ar (log P π (z)) > V ar (log π (θ)). In particular, this is a result of the following two limiting scenarios: (i) if for given γ V < 1, γ P approaches 1, i.e. the informed traders have very precise signals for given level of information in the price, or (ii) if γ V → 0, while γ P is bounded away from 0. In this case, the market becomes very noisy, for a given level of private information. On the other hand, V ar (log V π (z)) is always less than V ar (log π (θ)), which is a direct application of Blackwell's Theorem on comparison of information structures (Blackwell, 1951 (Blackwell, , 1953 .
Our main two theorems that follow generalize these observations about the unconditional wedge and excess price volatility. Theorem 1 below establishes that the sign and magnitude of the average wedge on the comparison of upside vs. downside risks. Theorem 2 generalizes the result that prices are more variable than expected dividends, and in some cases even more variable than realized dividends. Our second example, however, reinforces the observation that the conditional wedge W π (·) need not be monotone in general, and may also cross 0 at multiple points, which rules out conditional or local versions of these results without imposing additional assumption on dividends.
Example 2: Cubic dividend function
Suppose that π (θ) = θ + aθ 3 , with a > 0 to ensure monotonicity of π. For a cubic function (figure 2, panel b), the above approximation holds exactly, so that
where the first two terms correspond to the shift in means, and the last to the shift in residual uncertainty. If γ P + γ V > 1 and a sufficiently large, W π (0) < 0. Since W π (0) = 0, it follows immediately that W π (·) is non-monotone and crosses 0 in three different locations.
Unconditional information aggregation wedge
To obtain general results, we focus on unconditional moments of prices and expected dividends.
Let W π = E (W π (z)) denote the expected information aggregation wedge associated with a payoff function π(·). The next lemma provides a characterization of W π which forms the basis for the subsequent comparative statics results.
The unconditional information aggregation wedge W π is characterized by
This characterization shows how the wedge depends separately on both the curvature the payoff function, and the parameters describing the informational environment. The parameter σ P > σ θ corresponds to the prior variance of θ, as assessed by the marginal trader, and summarizes the importance of informational frictions in the market. By taking ex ante expectations over z, the shifts in mean and residual uncertainty combine into a mean-preserving spread between the weights that the marginal trader and the outsider associate with each realizations of θ.
The marginal trader places more weight on the tails of the fundamental distribution, from an ex ante perspective (i.e., σ P > σ θ ). This result can intuitively be understood as follows: the marginal trader's posterior of θ, conditional on z, is normal with mean γ P z and variance (1 − γ P ) σ 2 θ . The prior over z is normal with mean 0 and variance σ 2 θ /γ V . Compounding the two distributions, the marginal trader's prior over θ is characterized as a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
The outsider, on the other hand, holds the posterior that conditional on z, θ is normal with mean γ V z and variance (1 − γ V ) σ 2 θ . His compounded distribution then corresponds to the actual prior distribution of θ, as the prior variance is just ( 
θ . Hence, the information frictions summarized by the distance of σ P from σ θ will be large whenever the market signal is noisy relative to private signals, or the ratio γ P /γ V is high, as this leads to a large discrepancy between the posterior beliefs held by the marginal trader and the outsider.
We use Lemma 2 to sign the unconditional wedge as a function of the shape of the dividend function, and to offer comparative statics with respect to π and the informational parameters γ P and γ V . Our next definition provides a partial order on payoff functions that we will use for the comparative statics. (iii) A dividend function π 1 has more upside (less downside) risk than
This definition classifies payoff functions by comparing marginal gains and losses at fixed distances from the prior mean to determine whether the payoff exposes its owner to bigger payoff fluctuations on the upside or the downside. Any linear dividend function has symmetric risks, any convex function is dominated by upside risks, and any concave dividend function is dominated by downside risks. The classification however also extends to non-linear functions with symmetric gains and losses, as well as non-convex functions with upside risk or non-concave functions with downside risk. Figure 3 plots examples of payoff functions dominated by different types of risk. The following Theorem summarizes the comparative statics implications that follow directly from this partial order, and the characterization in lemma 2. (ii) Comparative Statics w.r.t. π: For given σ 2 P , if π 1 has more downside and less upside risk than π 2 , then W π 2 ≥ W π 1 .
(iii) Comparative Statics w.r.t. σ 2 P : If π is dominated by upside or downside risk, then |W π | is increasing in σ P . Moreover, lim σ P →σ θ |W π | = 0, and lim σ P →∞ |W π | = ∞, whenever there
(iv) Increasing differences: If π 1 has more upside risk than π 2 , then
This theorem summarizes how the shape of the dividend function and the informational parameters combine to determine the sign and magnitude of the unconditional information aggregation wedge. It shows that unconditional price premia or discounts arise as a combination of two elements: upside or downside risks in the dividend profile π, and an impact of private information on market prices (γ P > γ V ). The latter requires that updating from prices is noisy (γ V < 1). This
Theorem forms the first part of our core theoretical contribution, and shows that noisy information aggregation may influence conditional and unconditional returns of assets through their payoff profile and the informational characteristics of the market.
The result is easily understood from our interpretation of the wedge as the expected value of a symmetric, mean-preserving spread of the true underlying fundamental distribution.
Part (i) shows that the sign of the wedge is determined by whether π is dominated by upside, downside, or symmetric risk. When the dividend function has symmetric risk, the gains from this spread on the upside exactly cancel the expected losses on the downside, and the total effect is 0.
When the dividend is dominated by upside risks, the expected upside gains dominate and the value of the mean-preserving spread is positive, leading to a positive unconditional wedge. Conversely, when the dividend is dominated by downside risks, the expected losses on the downside dominate and the expected value of the spread is negative.
Parts (ii), (iii), and (iv) complement the first result on the possibility of price premia or discounts with specific predictions on how its magnitude depends on cash flow and informational characteristics.
Part (ii) shows that an asset with more upside or less downside risk on average has a higher price premium or a lower price discount, all else equal. Thus, returns on average are lower (and prices higher) for securities that represent more upside risks. Simply put, the mean-preserving spread becomes more valuable when the payoff function shifts towards more upside risk.
Part (iii) shows the role of informational parameters. For a given payoff function, the unconditional wedge increases in absolute value as the information aggregation friction has bigger effects (higher σ P ). For a given set of upside or downside risks, a bigger mean-preserving spread generates bigger gains or losses. Moreover, a wedge obtains only if γ P > γ V , i.e., if the heterogeneous beliefs have an impact on price. The wedge is increasing in γ P and decreasing in γ V , as the precision of market information and private information move the wedge in opposite directions. Under regularity conditions, which ensure that the payoff asymmetry doesn't disappear in the tails, the absolute value of the wedge approaches infinity when γ V → 0. This obtains if for a given value of β, the market noise becomes infinitely large. In this limiting case, the marginal trader remains responsive to z, even though the z is infinitely noisy.
Part (iv) shows that the unconditional wedge has increasing differences between the dominance of upside risk and the level of market noise. This implies that the effects of market noise and asymmetry in dividend risk are mutually reinforcing on the magnitude of the wedge. Importantly, our results on differences between expected prices and dividends are not a consequence of irrational trading strategies, behavioral biases of investors, or agency conflicts. Nor are such differences accounted for by risk premia (since traders are risk neutral). Our model thus offers a theory in which average prices can differ systematically from expected dividends as a result of the interplay between the dividend structure and the partial aggregation of information into prices, in a context where traders hold heterogeneous beliefs in equilibrium and arbitrage is limited. To our knowledge, this channel is new to the literature.
Excess Price Variability
Our second main result concerns the variability of prices, relative to expected dividends and realized dividends. As can readily be seen from the above characterizations, if W π (·) > 0, the unconditional variance of prices (prior to realization of z) exceeds the variability of expected dividends. Consider furthermore the limiting case where γ P → 1, in which P π (z) → π (z). Since the variance of z exceeds that of θ, it follows immediately that in this limit, where the informed traders' signals become arbitrarily precise, the variability of prices can exceed the variability of dividends. This result is illustrated in the linear and the log-normal examples discussed in section 3.1.
Our second theorem generalizes these observations. To do so, we will need to impose some restrictions to handle the non-linearities and higher-order effects that are confounding the comparative statics of W π with respect to z. Concretely, we will focus on risks that are symmetric or dominated by the upside or downside, and we will focus on
and
E (π (θ) − π (0)) 2 as our criterion for the variability of prices, expected dividends, and realized dividends, respectively, rather than the unconditional variances. The next theorem states our main result concerning excess variability:
Theorem 2 (Excess variability of prices) For any payoff function π (·) that is symmetric, dominated by upside, or dominated by downside risk:
(i) The variability of expected dividends is always less than the variability of realized dividends and the variability of prices:
(ii) The excess variability of prices relative to expected dividends is increasing in γ P and decreasing in γ V .
(iii) For any γ V , if γ P is sufficiently high, then the variability of prices exceeds the variability of realized dividends. The same occurs if, for given γ P , γ V is sufficiently low.
This theorem shows that the price is more variable than expected dividends, and if the market is sufficiently noisy, even more variable than realized dividends. The latter occurs in the limiting cases where supply shocks are unboundedly large (σ 2 u → ∞, γ V → 0), or the traders' private information is infinitely precise (β → ∞, γ P → 1). In the former case, the variability of prices can be arbitrarily large, even as the variability of realized and expected dividends is bounded. The statement of the result relies on two restrictions which we used for analytical tractability. First, the focus on a variability measure which combines a variance with a bias between the average price and the price at the average fundamental. Second, we restrict ourselves to symmetric, upside or downside risks. With these restrictions, the results are the cleanest, and easiest to interpret.
To understand this result, and the source of excess price variability in our model, it is useful to think of a counter-factual third person who observes a signal z with distribution z|θ ∼ N (θ, (β + βσ −2 u ) −1 ). Like the uninformed outsider, this third person is fully Bayesian, but has access to a more informative signal, whose precision matches that of the marginal traders'. Therefore in comparison to the marginal trader, the third person will form the same posterior beliefs, conditonal on a realization of z, but z will be drawn from a distribution with a lower ex ante variance, and be consistent with Bayes' Rule derived from the objective signal precision. In comparison to the uninformed outsider, the third person is also fully Bayesian, but with simply a more precise signal. We break down the comparison between E (P π (z) − P π (0)) 2 and the other terms into a comparison between E (P π (z) − P π (0)) 2 and E (P π (z) − P π (0)) 2 |z ∼ N (θ, (β + βσ −2 u ) −1 ) , and the comparison of this latter term with the ex ante variability of expected and realized dividends. E (P π (z) − P π (0)) 2 |z ∼ N (θ, (β + βσ −2 u ) −1 corresponds to the counter-factual variability of prices, if z had been drawn from a distribution z|θ ∼ N (θ, (β + βσ −2 u ) −1 ), such that P π (z) is consistent with a posterior expectation of π conditional on z.
For the comparison of the counter-factual variability of prices with the variability in expected and realized dividends, we first proceed to break down the variability measures into a variance and a bias term. The variance terms can then be compared using Blackwell's theorem on the comparison of experiments (Blackwell, 1951 (Blackwell, , 1953 . Since π (θ), P π (z), and V π (z) correspond to the posterior expectation of π (θ) for respectively, an agent who observes the true θ, the counter-factual signal z, and the actual signal z, the unconditional variance of π exceeds the unconditional variance of P under the distribution z ∼ N (θ, (β + βσ −2 u ) −1 ), which exceeds the unconditional variance of V under the distribution z ∼ N (θ, σ 2 u /β). For symmetric, upside and downside risks, the bias terms follow exactly the same ranking. 9 Therefore, if this second term was the only relevant component, the variability of prices in our model would satisfy the standard conditions resulting from the Blackwell comparison of experiments -namely, that a more informative price signal raises price volatility and expected dividend volatility, but both are bounded by the volatility of realized dividends. At best, the volatility gap can be brought close to zero when information in the market is sufficiently precise. For models in which asset prices are always equal to expected future dividends, this observation is made precise by West (1988).
The excess volatility then results from the first term, which measures the over-reaction of the price compared to its true information content. This term measures the difference between the variability in prices under the objective signal distribution z ∼ N (θ, σ 2 u /β) with the variability in prices (derived from the same price function) for a counter-factual signal distribution z ∼ N (θ, (β + βσ −2 u ) −1 ), under which the market's beliefs are consistent with Bayes' Rule. This over-reaction effect is always positive, and may be strong enough to cause the volatility of prices to exceed the volatility of realized dividends. This becomes possible in particular when information frictions in the market (as measured by the gap between γ P and γ V ) are sufficiently severe.
To conclude, we point out that the same forces that lead to large excess volatility in prices also generate a low correlation of prices with realized dividends.
Proposition 2 (Low predictability of dividends)
corr(P π (z) , π (θ)) = 0 and lim
The key to this result is to note that the unconditional correlation of prices and realized dividends is bounded above by the ratio between the unconditional variances of the expected and realized dividends V π (z) and π (θ). Likewise, the OLS regression coefficient for regressing realized dividends against prices is bounded by the ratio of the unconditional variances of V π (z) and P π (z).
When γ V is sufficiently low, i.e. when the market signal is very uninformative, then these ratios are close to zero (i.e. the posterior expectation remains much closer to the prior expectation than the actual dividend realization, and the posterior expectation is much less volatile than the price).
In this case, the predictability of dividends from prices is very low. This turns out to be precisely the case in which the information aggregation wedge also has the potential to generate large excess price volatility.
possible comparison between the actual and the counter-factual variance of prices. This variability measure then introduces the need to also rank the bias terms, which is done for symmetric, upside or downside risks. Since the bias terms are likely to be small compared to the variances, similar, but technically less clean results are likely to hold for arbitrary risks or other variability measures.
These results offer a new perspective on the well documented "excess volatility puzzle" (Le Roy and Porter 1981; Shiller 1981), and the low predictability of future dividend growth. As reported by Shiller (1981) and Le Roy and Porter (1981), the volatility of realized dividends is much lower than the volatility in prices. In representative agent models with Bayesian updating, the volatility of expected dividends can never exceed realized dividends (West, 1988) , whose importance in variance decomposition tests is very small. 10 Therefore, the literature has focused on variation in the stochastic discount factor coming from risk aversion as a source of excess price volatility in economies that allow a representative agent characterization (Campbell and Shiller 1988; Cochrane, 1992) .
At the same time, a large body of empirical work in finance suggests that share prices are at best a very noisy predictor of future growth in dividends. As reviewed in Campbell (2003) traders have sufficiently precise private information, then our model can jointly account for large excess price volatility, and low predictability of future dividend yields.
Whether heterogeneous expectations can quantitatively account for observed excess price volatility and low predictability of future dividends is an empirical question we do not address here.
Rather, the contribution of our model in this respect is to offer a theoretical framework, fully consistent with agent rationality, where this channel is not ruled out by the mere observation that the variability of actual dividends is modest, and not highly correlated with prices.
In this section, we study two applications of our theory. First, we reconsider the Modigliani-Miller
Theorem. Second, in a dynamic extension of our model we show conditions under which bubbles arise.
Splitting Cash-flows to influence market value
The Modigliani Consider a seller who owns claims on a stochastic dividend π (·). This cash flow is divided into two parts, π 1 and π 2 , both monotone in θ, such that π 1 + π 2 = π, and then sold to traders in two separate markets. We assume that π 2 has more upside risk than π 1 . For each claim, there is a unit measure of informed traders who obtain a noisy private signal x i ∼ N θ, β
, and a noise trader demand Φ (s i ), where
That is, each market is affected by a noise trader shock s i with market-specific noise parameter σ 2 u,i . The environment is then characterized by the market-characteristics β i and σ 2 u,i , and by the correlation of demand shocks across markets, ρ. Traders are active only in their respective market.
However, we consider both the possibility that traders observe and condition on prices in the other market (informational linkages), and the possibility that they do not (informational segregation).
Under informational segregation, the analysis of the two markets can be completely separated;
any correlation between the two in prices is the result of correlation in demand shocks, as well as the common underlying fundamental, but this doesn't influence expected revenues. The equilibrium characterization from proposition 1 applies separately in each market:
The seller's total expected revenue in excess of the cash flow's expected dividend value is then given by W π 1 (σ P,1 ) + W π 2 (σ P,2 ), where σ P,i is determined as in lemma 2, and denotes the level of informational frictions in each market.
With informational linkages, the equilibrium analysis has to be adjusted to incorporate the information contained in price 1 for the traders in market 2, and vice versa. The characterization proceeds along the same lines as the previous model. Since expected dividends are monotone, informed traders in market i will buy a security if and only if their private signal exceeds a threshold x i (·), wherex i (·) is conditioned on both prices. By market-clearing, it must be the case that
Observing P i is then isomorphic to observing z i , and observing both prices is isomorphic to observing (z 1 , z 2 ). We let (z 1 , z 2 ) denote the state, and consider equilibrium price functions P 1 (·) and P 2 (·) that are measurable w.r.t. (z 1 , z 2 ). It is then straight-forward to characterize posterior beliefs over θ using Bayes'rule, and to characterize the traders' indifference conditions and hence the market price functions, and expected dividends, conditional on (z 1 , z 2 ):
In Appendix B we fully characterize expected prices and dividends for this two asset model. In particular, we show the following modified version of lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (Unconditional Wedge with two assets) For each cash-flow π i , the unconditional information aggregation wedge W π i is characterized by
Therefore, the cases of informational segregation and informational linkages only differ in terms of how our measure of informational frictions σ P,i depends on the underlying primitive parameters in each case, but for given values of π i and σ P,i , the seller's expected revenue net of expected dividends in both cases is W π 1 (σ P,1 ) + W π 2 (σ P,2 ). We can now state a first version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for expected revenues in our model. (
The key to this proposition is that, for given values of σ P , the expected information aggregation wedge is additive across cash flows: W π 1 (σ P ) + W π 2 (σ P ) = W π 1 +π 2 (σ P ), for any σ P , π 1 and π 2 .
If the two markets have identical characteristics, i.e. σ P,1 = σ P,2 , only the combined cash flow matters for the total wedge -i.e. the Modigliani-Miller result applies. If on the other hand the two markets have different informational characteristics, then the increasing difference property of W π 1 (·) implies that the seller's revenue is influenced by how the two cash flows are matched to the two markets, and the revenue is higher when the upside risk is matched with the market that has more severe information frictions (a higher value of σ P ). Intuitively, the seller exploits the information aggregation wedge to manipulate revenues, matching the pool of investors with high informational frictions with the upside risk, while selling the downside risks to an investor pool with lower informational frictions. This maximizes the gains from the positive wedge resulting on the upside, while it minimizes the losses from the negative wedge on the downside. This logic is pushed further by the next proposition, which considers how the seller can exploit the heterogeneity in investor pools if she gets to design the split of π into π 1 and π 2 .
Proposition 4 (Designing Cash flows)
The seller maximizes her expected revenues by splitting cash flows according to π * 1 (θ) = min {π (θ) , π (0)} and π * 2 (θ) = max {π (θ) − π (0) , 0}, and then assigning π * 1 to the investor pool with the lower value of σ P . Figure 4 sketches the optimal dividend split for an arbitrary dividend function. The seller maximizes the total proceeds by assigning all the cash flow below the line defined by π(.) = π(0)
to the investor group with the lowest information friction parameter; σ P,1 , and the complement to the investor group with the highest friction; σ P,2 . It is easy to show that any other arbitrary division of cash flows {π 1 (·), π 2 (·)} implies that both π
. That is, π 1 has less downside risk than π * 1 , and π 2 has less upside risk than π * 2 . The increasing difference property of part iv) in Theorem 1 then implies that any transfer of cash flows between investor groups resulting from the alternative split reduces the total proceeds of the issuance. Intuitively, the optimal split loads the entire downside risk on the investor group that discounts the price of the claim the least with respect to its expected payoff (because of the low friction parameter; σ P,1 ), while loading the entire upside risk to the group that overvalues the claim the most with respect to its expected dividend (due to the high information frictions; σ P,2 ). When π (·) > 0, this split has a straight-forward interpretation in terms of debt and equity, with a default point on debt that is set at the prior mean θ = 0.
An important limitation of the discussion in this section is that we take as given the differences in market characteristics. Moreover, we are implicitly assuming that, given these differences, the seller can freely assign the cash-flows to these two pools. In practice the situation is of course more complicated, because the investor's incentives to obtain information also depends on the asset risks they face. Analyzing this interplay between investor's information choices and the resulting market characteristics, along with the seller's security design question is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but an important avenue for further work. The results here are simply intended to highlight the possibility of systematic departures from Modigliani and Miller's (1958) irrelevance result, and
show that the information frictions give the owner of a cash flow distinct possibility to manipulate its market value through strategic security design.
We conclude this section by stating a second version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for realized Proposition 5 (Modigliani-Miller II) (i) With informational segregation: z 2 ) almost surely, if and only if the noise trading is perfectly correlated across markets (ρ = 1), and the two markets have identical informational characteristics (β 1 = β 2 and σ 2 u,1 = σ 2 u,2 ). (ii) With informational linkages P π 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) + P π 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) = P π (z 1 , z 2 ) almost surely, if and only if the noise trading is perfectly correlated across markets (ρ = 1), and either β 1 = β 2 and
The perfect correlation reduces the noise to a single common shock. That this is necessary for the theorem to hold under segregation is immediate. It is also necessary for the case with informational linkages, because of the different weighting between the signals for the marginal traders in the two markets. In addition the signal distributions need to be the same, requiring that β 1 = β 2 and σ 2 u,1 = σ 2 u,2 . Finally, the wedge needs to be the same in the two markets, or σ P,1 = σ P,2 . Together these conditions imply that the two markets have identical informational characteristics, and the marginal trader therefore holds identical beliefs. In the case with informational linkages, we need to consider the additional possibility that when
u,2 and ρ = 1, the observations of two signals with different precision but perfectly correlated noise enables every trader to perfectly infer θ and u from the two prices regardless of the informational parameters, hence P π 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) + P π 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) = π(θ).
An interim version of the theorem therefore requires perfect correlation in the noise in different markets, on top of identical informational characteristics.
Dynamic Trading and Bubbles
As our second application, we consider a simple dynamic extension of our basic model, and show by means of an example how it can easily result in persistent (or even permanent) over-valuation of securities. Standard arguments imply that no arbitrage and common information rules out the possibility of rational bubbles for a general class of dynamic asset market economies (Tirole, 1982; Santos and Woodford, 1997) . This is one of the classic no-arbitrage results: while a buy-andhold strategy insures that a security can never be worth less than its fundamental value under no-arbitrage, a positive bubble component in the price is consistent with arbitrage by buy-and-sell strategies only if its date zero present value follows a Martingale process. But this is inconsistent with the implication of discounting and the transversality condition, that aggregate wealth and the present discounted value of aggregate consumption has finite present value -unless the bubble component is exactly zero.
Here, we show in a simple dynamic example how heterogeneous information and our limits to arbitrage break exactly this result. It is still true that the anticipation of a higher price in the future leads traders to bid up the price in the current period. In our environment, however, extending the insights of Theorem 1 to a dynamic environment, we show that a positive wedge (on average) is sustainable in the future, and leads to a higher willingness to pay in the current period. If this anticipation of a positive future wedge is sufficiently strong it can more than offset a negative contribution of current payoffs to the wedge, implying that the security is priced above the present discounted value of future dividends in all periods and states.
We establish this result in a model in which per period cashflows π (·) are i.i.d. over time, and the security is infinitely lived. As conditions, we require that π (·) is dominated by upside risks, so that on average it is expected to trade at a premium, and bounded below (non-negative), so that there is a bound on the wedge on the downside. Inverting the conditions, we also obtain that a security that is dominated by downside risks and has a uniform bound on the upside may trade permanently at a discount.
Time is discrete and infinite, and in each period a new trading round takes place, with informed traders and noise traders. As before the total asset supply is 1. The asset pays dividends π (θ t ) after the current trading round has taken place (hence θ t is publicly known before the start of period t + 1). For simplicity we assume that the fundamental θ t and the stochastic demand shock u t are distributed as specified as in section 2, and i.i.d. over time. 11 Traders are long-lived and risk-neutral and discount the future at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
The lack of persistence in the dividend process implies that trading in round t only aggregates information about the current fundamental, but includes the anticipation of future prices. Formally, the payoff to a share bought in period t is π (θ t ) + δP (z t+1 ), where P (z t+1 ) is the price in period t + 1, contingent on the period t + 1 state z t+1 . The price then satisfies the following recursive characterization:
and the expected dividend value of the asset satisfies:
11 It is possible but outside the scope of the current paper to extend the analysis to allow for persistent fundamental processes. The i.i.d. case is sufficient to convey the core insights that anticipated future wedges influence the current level of the wedge.
Using the fact that in the i.i.d. case, the expected future prices and dividend values correspond to the unconditional ones, we have the following characterization of the information aggregation wedge in the dynamic model:
is the wedge resulting from the current period payoffs, and E (w π (z)) its corresponding unconditional expectation. Thus, the information aggregation wedge in the dynamic setting depends on both the wedge resulting from current payoffs, and the expected discounted future wedge. Even when the current wedge is negative (at low realizations of z), the overall wedge may still be positive because traders anticipate higher share prices in the future. The following proposition formalizes this observation.
Proposition 6 (Sustainability of Bubbles) Suppose that π (θ) is bounded below, increasing, and convex. Then, for any σ P > σ θ , there existsδ < 1 such that for all δ >δ, W (z) > 0, for all z. This example is of course highly stylized, as a complete and exhaustive discussion of dynamic extensions of our model leads to additional difficulties on its own, which exceed the scope of this paper, and are left to future work. Nevertheless it is suggestive of the types of markets in which information-driven bubbles are likely to emerge, and when they are likely to occur, namely those that represent significant future upside opportunities, and/or markets in which investors face implicit protection against downside risks. Furthermore, such bubbles are more likely to occur in time periods where real interest rates are low.
Discussion
In this section, we explore the robustness of the information aggregation wedge to changes in the model's core assumptions. We show that the information aggregation wedge is (i) robust to alternative specifications of the prior distribution of θ, alternative distributions of private signals, and arbitrary specifications of the position limits, and (ii) inversely related to the extent of arbitrage activity by risk-neutral, uninformed traders (or more specifically the demand elasticity of noise and uninformed traders). Proposition 7 (Distributional Assumptions and arbitrage limits) In the unique asset market equilibrium, the price function P (z) is characterized by
Distributional assumptions and limits to arbitrage
and the traders' threshold function isx(p) = z = P −1 (p). The expected dividend conditional on z takes the form
where
Risk-neutrality, position limits and the MLRP on private signals allow us to retain a threshold characterization for the buying strategy of informed traders. We can then use the market-clearing condition to redefine the information conveyed through P by an observable state variable z =x (P ), whose realization depends only on the exogenous shocks θ and D. The indifference condition for the marginal trader implies that P (z) = E (π(θ)|x = z, z). That is, the asset price equal the expectation of an informed trader with public signal z and an independent private signal x whose realization also equals z. The expected dividend, on the other hand, conditions on z only once as the market signal. The final step in the proof consists in characterizing the distribution of z from the primitive distributions, and showing that its conditional pdf is
This characterization shows that the logic of the wedge is not directly tied to the specific distributional assumptions that we have made (other than the MLRP assumption on signals). It also 
Price impact of information
We now generalize our previous formulation to allow for a response of uninformed traders to perceived excess returns on the asset, as well as stochastic trading motives which are unrelated to dividend expectations (for example, liquidity or hedging needs). We keep the same model as in section 2, but consider the following formulation for asset demand:
with u ∼ N 0, σ 2 u . Uninformed traders' demand is increasing in the expected return conditional on the price, E (π (θ) |P ) − P , with an elasticity given by η. 12 The parameter η captures the responsiveness of uninformed traders to the expectation of dividends in excess of prices, or in other words, the extent to which they are willing or able to arbitrage away the difference between expected price and dividend value. Equivalently, η measures the price impact of private information which relates naturally to the concept of market liquidity.
We follow our previous equilibrium characterization and asset prices with minor changes to account for the endogeneity of demand to asset prices. Market-clearing implies Φ √ β (x (P ) − θ) = Φ (u + η (E (π (θ) |P ) − P )), or
Observing P is thus isomorphic to observing z ∼ N θ, σ −2 u /β , and Lemma 1 continues to hold without any changes. Using the fact that the expected dividend is E (π (θ) |P ) = E (π (θ) |z) = V (z), the equilibrium price function is implicitly defined by the marginal trader's indifference condition
This condition implicitly defines the equilibrium price. Let P (z; η) denote the equilibrium price as a function of the elasticity parameter η, and P (z; 0) = P (z) the price function with inelastic
supply. The next proposition shows that the magnitude of the information aggregation wedge is inversely related to the uninformed trader's demand elasticity.
Therefore, the more elastically the uninformed and noise traders respond to the wedge between prices and expected dividends, the more they arbitrage away this difference, and the smaller the information aggregation wedge becomes. This is illustrated by figure 5, which illustrates (in comparison to figure 1) how the price impact of a shift in θ is muted by the price elasticity of uninformed traders.
The wedge results from the informed traders' impact on equilibrium prices. The more traders move prices by acting on their private information, the larger is the wedge. In the inelastic case, the wedge was maximized as the informed traders fully determined prices. In the other extreme, their price impact vanishes in the limit as η → ∞ and the uninformed traders completely arbitrage the wedge. The parameter η can thus also be intuitively interpreted as a measure of the limits to arbitrage by uninformed, risk neutral outsiders.
We can illustrate these effects simply in the example with linear dividends: π (θ) = θ. In this case, the expected dividend value is V (z) = γ V · z, as before. The price however solves Compared to the case with inelastic demand, the over-reaction is smaller, i.e. the coefficient in front of z is decreasing in η, and converges to 1 as η → ∞. The wedge
is also decreasing in η and vanishes as η → ∞. The information aggregation wedge is therefore largest when uninformed traders are not actively arbitraging the expected return difference coming from the information aggregation wedge.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a theory of asset price formation based on heterogeneous information and limits to arbitrage. This theory ties expected asset returns to properties of their risk profile, and generates a channel for excess price volatility. The theory is parsimonious, in the sense that all its results follow directly from the interplay between heterogeneous information and limits to arbitrage. The theory is general, in the sense that we do not impose any strong restrictions on the distribution of asset payoffs for the purpose of tractability (although we do impose such restrictions on information, risk preferences and noise-trading assumptions), but rather aim to identify the relevant underlying features of cash flows at a general level. And the theory is tractable and lends itself easily to applications, as suggested by our discussion of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and the sustainability of bubbles.
We conclude with short remarks on future potential research directions and our related research.
An important avenue for future work is to merge our model with risk-based asset pricing models. In Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011a) we provide a first step in this direction to study information aggregation wedge in a CARA-normal setup. We show that the main intuition and results extend in the case where (as is common in CARA models) dividends are symmetrically normally distributed.
A second direction, also explored in one-going related research (Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2011b), is to incorporate the release of public news and disclosures into our asset pricing model, and explore both positive and normative implications of public information and disclosure rules for asset prices. A third important extension is to extend the analysis of a multi-period, and multi-asset extensions of our market model, both of which have already been touched upon in this paper in the context of specific examples. A final important direction lies in the integration of financial market frictions with real decisions that endogenize the dividend payoff function we considered here. In a companion paper (Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2011c), we consider one such model in which there is interplay between information aggregation, firm decisions and managerial incentives in a simple model of informational feedback.
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i): By market-clearing, z =x(P (z)) andx(P (z )) = z , and therefore z = z if and only if P (z) = P (z ).
Part (ii): Since P (z) is invertible, observing P is equivalent to observing z =x(P (z)) in equilibrium. But z|θ ∼ N θ, σ 2 u /β , from which the characterization of H (·|x, P ) follows immediately from Bayes' Law.
Proof of Proposition 1. Substitutingx(P ) = z, a price function P (z) is part of an equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (6) and is invertible. π (·) is strictly increasing, and an increase in z represents a first-order stochastic shift in the posterior over θ, so the price function P π (z) is continuous and monotone over its domain and spans its entire range, hence invertible. Moreover, all prices are observed in equilibrium (and hence out-of-equilibrium beliefs play no role). Thus, P π (z) defines the unique equilibrium in which prices are conditioned only on z.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the law of iterated expectations, E (V (z)) = E (π (θ)) = ∞ −∞ π (θ) dΦ (θ/σ θ ).
To find E (P (z)), define σ 2 P = σ 2 θ (1 + (γ P /γ V − 1) γ P ). Simple algebra shows that
With this, we compute E (P (z)):
Therefore, W π is
where the first equality proceeds by integration by parts, the second by a change in variables, and the third step uses the symmetry of the normal distribution (Φ (−x) = 1 − Φ (x)).
Proof of Theorem 1. Parts (i) − (iii) follow immediately from lemma 2, the definition of upside and downside risk, and the fact that Φ (θ/σ θ ) > Φ (θ/σ P ) for all θ (since σ P > σ θ ). For part (iv) notice that
where ∆ (θ) = π 1 (θ) − π 1 (−θ) − (π 2 (θ) − π 2 (−θ)).
Since π 1 is has more upside risk than π 2 , ∆ (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, which implies that W π 1 (σ P )−W π 2 (σ P )
is increasing in σ P .
Proof of Theorem 2. Part (i): To compare the volatility of prices with that of expected dividends, we write E (P π (z) − P π (0)) 2 as
But then, the expected revenue of selling π 1 to the investor pool with σ P,1 and π 2 to the investor pool with σ P,2 is W π 1 (σ P,1 ) + W π 2 (σ P,2 ) = W π (σ P,1 ) + W π 2 (σ P,2 ) − W π 2 (σ P,1 ), while the expected revenue from selling π * 1 to the investor pool with σ P,1 and π * 2 to the investor pool with σ P,2 is W π * 1 (σ P,1 )+W π * 2 (σ P,2 ) = W π (σ P,1 )+W π * 2 (σ P,2 )−W π * 2 (σ P,1 ). The difference in revenues is therefore W π * 2 (σ P,2 )−W π * 2 (σ P,1 )−(W π 2 (σ P,2 ) − W π 2 (σ P,1 )), which is positive, since π * 2 contains more upside and less downside risk than π 2 , and σ P,2 ≥ σ P,1 (Theorem 1, part (iv)).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Clearly, z 1 = z 2 = z almost surely if and only if ρ = 1. If β 1 = β 2 and σ 2 u,1 = σ 2 u,2 , it then follows that P π 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) + P π 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) = P π (z), almost surely, if and only if ρ = 1. Moreover, it follows from the characterizations of P π 1 and P π 2 that the price function is no longer additive (even if ρ = 1), whenever β 1 = β 2 or σ 2 u,1 = σ 2 u,2 , unless the markets are informationally linked, and β 1 σ −2 u,1 = β 2 σ 2 u,2 . In this last case, we find that signals have different precision, but perfectly correlated errors, so θ and the correlated error can be perfectly inferred from the two signals, i.e.
V → ∞ in the characterization in lemma 3, and the wedge disappears.
Proof of Proposition 6. If π (·) is convex, then by Theorem 1, for any finite w, there existŝ δ < 1, s.t. δ >δ, δE (w (z)) > − (1 − δ) w. We therefore need to establish a lower bound for w (z).
But if π (·) is bounded below, then lim z→−∞ w (z) = 0, and w (z) is positive for sufficiently high z, so it is necessarily bounded.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Risk-neutrality, position limits, and the MLRP on private signals jointly imply that E (π(θ)|x, P ) is monotone in x, and the informed demand is characterized by a private signal thresholdx (P ) which satisfies the same indifference condition as (2), with the posterior H (·|x, P ) to be determined. Market-clearing then implies that d L F (x (P ) |θ) + d H (1 − F (x (P ) |θ)) + D = 1, or
Since the LHS is increasing inx (P ) and decreasing in θ, and the RHS is increasing in D, we can define the endogenous market signal by z =x (P ) which is informationally equivalent to observing P . But then, this implies that equilibrium prices take the form P (z) = E (π(θ)|x = z, z) = π(θ)h (θ) ϕ (z|θ) f (z|θ) dθ h (θ) ϕ (z|θ) f (z|θ) dθ , where ϕ (z|θ) denotes the posterior density of z conditional on θ. To complete the proof notice that
Proof of Proposition 8.
If P (z; 0) = V (z), then P (z; η) = V (z) solves the pricing equation for any η > 0. If P (z; 0) = V (z), then define the function T η (P, z) as T η (P, z) = E π (θ) |z + η/ β · (V (z) − P ) , z .
T η (P, z) is continuous and decreasing in P , and T η (V (z) , z) = P (z; 0). Moreover, if V (z) > P (z; 0), then T η (P (z; 0) , z) > P (z; 0), T η (V (z) , z) < V (z), and therefore there exists a unique P (z; η) ∈ (P (z; 0) , V (z)), such that T η (P (z; η) , z) = P (z; η). If instead V (z) < P (z; 0), then T η (P (z; 0) , z) < P (z; 0), T η (V (z) , z) > V (z), and T η (P (z; η) , z) = P (z; η) for a unique P (z; η) ∈ (V (z) , P (z; 0)). Moreover, replacing P (z; 0) with P (z; η ) for η < η in the steps above shows that |P (z; η) − V (z)| is strictly decreasing in η. For the limit, notice that since P (z; η) is monotone in η and bounded, it must converge to a limit P (z; ∞) = lim η→∞ P (z; η).
If P (z; ∞) > V (z), then P (z; ∞) = lim η→∞ T η (P (z; η) , z) = −∞, whereas if P (z; ∞) < V (z), then P (z; ∞) = lim η→∞ T η (P (z; η) , z) = ∞., both of which are contradictions. Therefore, we are left with P (z; ∞) = V (z) at the limit.
